State Fish Stocking Programs at Risk: Takings Under the Endangered Species Act by Stein, Amy L.
Stein_final_cpcxns .doc 2/22/2010 9:32:05 AM 
 
63 
STATE FISH STOCKING PROGRAMS AT RISK:  
TAKINGS UNDER THE    
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
AMY L. STEIN* 
 
“If these ‘environmentalists’ really wanted to help the poor 
animals, they would commit suicide to leave more room.”1 
 
Anyone who yawns at the mention of “fish stocking” may be 
oblivious to the fact that it can elicit such an intense response, 
especially from a fisherman.  Fish stocking, raising fish in a hatchery 
and placing those non-native fish into a water body, has been in 
practice for over a hundred years.2  The primary purposes of fish 
stocking include the following: (1) mitigating declines of fish 
populations caused by federal water projects;3 (2) helping to recover 
fish species listed on the Endangered Species Act;4 and (3) providing 
wildlife-oriented recreational opportunities like fishing.5  In the case 
of U.S. Pacific salmon, “[h]atchery programs generally have two goals 
which can conflict with one another: to increase the number of 
salmon available for fishing, and to prevent natural salmon from 
becoming extinct.”6 
While the virtues of supplementing wild populations of fish are 
often extolled, scientific studies have indicated that fish stocking can 
 
 * Visiting Associate Professor of Legal Research and Writing, The George Washington 
University Law School.  Thanks to William Stein IV and my research assistants, Sara Vink and 
Jessica Katz. 
 1. Ted Williams, Got Trout?, FLY ROD & REEL, Apr. 2009, at 18, available at http:// 
www.mylfrog.info/pdfs/FRR_gottrout.pdf. 
 2. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Fisheries and Habitat Conservation, http://www.fws.gov/ 
fisheries/fisheries.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009) (discussing how U.S. Commission of Fish and 
Fisheries were charged in 1872 with “supplementing declining native stocks of coastal and lake 
food fish through fish propagation.”). 
 3. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., National Fish Hatchery System, http://www.fws.gov/ 
fisheries/nfhs/ (last visited Dec 26, 2009). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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harm the wild, native species of the water body.7  Reports have 
established the propensity of hatchery fish to out-compete the native 
fish for food sources,8 the frequency of hatchery fish to feed on the 
native species,9 the transmission of disease,10 and the dilution of the 
native fish gene pool through mating of the hatchery and native fish.11  
The National Park Service has heeded this scientific data and has 
banned fish stocking in all of the National Parks.12  Yet there is a 
 
 7. See, e.g., GENE S. HELFMAN, FISH CONSERVATION: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING 
AND RESTORING GLOBAL AQUATIC BIODIVERSITY AND FISHERY RESOURCES 422 (2007) 
(citing R.R. Reisenbichler & S.P. Rubin, Genetic Changes from Artificial Propagation of Pacific 
Salmon Affect the Productivity and Viability of Supplemented Populations, 56 ICES J. MARINE 
SCI. 459, 459 (1999), which concludes that supplementation programs degraded wild strains and 
that “artificial propagation poses a genetic threat to conservation of naturally spawning 
populations”); id. at 432 (citing R.S. Waples, Dispelling Some Myths about Hatcheries, 24 
FISHERIES 12 (1999), which concludes that hatcheries have many adverse effects on wild fishes); 
C. Boydston et al., Nonindigenous Fish, available at  
http://biology.usgs.gov/status_trends/static_content/documents/olrdocs/Nonative.pdf (examining 
issues that arise with the introduction of nonindigenous fish). 
 8. See Robert T. Lackey, Fisheries: History, Science, and Management, in WATER 
ENCYCLOPEDIA: SURFACE AND AGRICULTURAL WATER 121 (Jay H. Lehr & Jack Keely eds., 
2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/wed/pages/staff/lackey/pubs/history.pdf (“Non-
indigenous species often compete with or prey upon commercially or recreationally important 
fish species”). 
 9. See Ramon Vandern Brule & Nick Gayeski, An Overwhelming Body of Evidence: How 
Hatcheries are Jeopardizing Salmon Recovery, WASH. TROUT REP., Spring 2003, available at 
http://www.washingtontrout.org/Hatchery%20Article.pdf (claiming that “[b]oth predation and 
displacement of wild juveniles by hatchery juveniles is occurring in rivers and estuaries 
throughout the Northwest”). 
 10. See, e.g., Joseph Kiesecker, Fish-Stocking May Spread Amphibian Disease, 
CONSERVATION MAG., Oct. 2001, available at http://www.conservationmagazine.org/articles/ 
v2n4/fish-stocking-may-spread-amphibian-disease/. 
 11. See HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, COLUMBIA RIVER HATCHERY REFORM 
PROJECT, FINAL SYSTEM-WIDE REPORT, APPENDIX A.1: PREDICTED FITNESS EFFECTS OF 
INTERBREEDING BETWEEN HATCHERY AND NATURAL POPULATIONS OF PACIFIC SALMON 
AND STEELHEAD 2 , available at http://www.hatcheryreform.us/hrp_downloads/reports/ 
columbia_river/system-wide/4_appendix_a_1_interbreeding_fitness_effects.pdf (noting that 
“[t]he propagation of Pacific salmon and steelhead . . . in hatcheries has raised concerns for 
more than 30 years regarding the long-term genetic effects of hatchery-origin fish on the mean 
fitness of natural populations”); UC DAVIS CTR. FOR WATERSHED SCIS., SALMON, 
STEELHEAD, AND TROUT IN CALIFORNIA: STATUS OF AN EMBLEMATIC FAUNA 142 (2008), 
available at http://www.caltrout.org/SOS-Californias-Native-Fish-Crisis-Final-Report.pdf 
(estimating that the fitness, i.e. ability to produce young that survive to reproduce, of steelhead 
decreases almost 40% per generation of hatchery culture). 
 12. The last hold-out was the North Cascades National Park.  The National Park Service 
indicated that if Congress did not explicitly authorize fish stocking in the Cascades by July 1, 
2009, the practice would be banned.  On June 2, 2009, the House of Representatives passed 
H.R. 2430, to direct the Secretary to continue fish stocking in certain North Cascades lakes, but 
the Senate failed to pass the bill.  See also National Parks Traveler, Stocking of Non-Native Fish 
at North Cascades National Park Comes to a Halt (July 3, 2009), 
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federal hatchery system designed to research and implement fish 
stocking across the country,13 and fish stocking is in full force in over 
thirty-five of the fifty U.S. states.14 
For many years, fish stocking has flown relatively low on the 
legal radar screen.15  But one case brought by environmental 
organizations in California may change that.  In 2006, the Pacific 
Rivers Council and the Center for Biodiversity brought suit against 
the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) under 
California’s “little NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act),” the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), for failure to 
consider the effects of fish stocking on native populations.16  Included 
in the evidence against the state agency were expert affidavits and 
reference to over 100 scientific studies attesting to the harms of trout 
stocking on native populations.17  The plaintiffs specified twenty-five 
 
http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2009/07/stocking-non-native-fish-north-cascades-
national-park-comes-halt (discussing stocking of non-native fish species in national parks). 
 13. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 3. 
 14. G. Edwards and J. Nickum, Use of Propagated Fishes in Fish and Wildlife Service 
Programs 22 U.S.-JAPAN AQUACULTURE PANEL SYMP. (1993), available at 
http://www.lib.noaa.gov/japan/aquaculture/report22/edwards.html; see also Fishintrips.net, Fish 
Stocking Reports, available at http://www.fishintrips.net/StockReports.html. 
 15. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Andrus, 476 F.Supp. 966, 970 (D. Co. 
1979) (Endangered Species Act suit against Utah officials for violating section 9 with fish 
stocking dismissed for lack of jurisdiction); In re Operation of the Mo. River System Litig., 363 
F.Supp.2d 1145, 1169, n. 13 (D. Minn. 2004) (holding for Fish and Wildlife Services and states 
against section 9 Endangered Species Act suit for fish stocking where plaintiffs failed to respond 
to defendants’ motions on the issue). 
 16. Pac. Rivers Council v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Game, No. 06 CS 01451 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 
24, 2008). 
 17. Plaintiffs allege that the stocking of hatchery-reared fish significantly reduced 
populations of threatened and endangered fish and amphibians; resulted in hybridization that 
can permanently genetically alter or effectively eliminate populations of threatened and 
endangered wild trout and salmon; introduced diseases and invasive species that adversely 
affect native fauna; and negatively impacted native ecosystems and food webs.  Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petitioners’ Response to Respondent’s 
Motion for Modification of Judgment and Peremptory Writ at 3, Pac. Rivers Council v. Cal. 
Dep’t of Fish & Game, No. 06 CS 01451 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 2008). 
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fish and amphibians at risk,18 including sixteen endangered or 
threatened species.19 
After two years of litigation, the California Superior Court 
required the DFG to comply with CEQA and prepare an 
environmental assessment.20  While the state prepared its assessment, 
the court ordered interim measures that limit DFG’s ability to stock 
fish where monitoring surveys have demonstrated the presence of 
certain sensitive native aquatic and amphibian species, or where 
monitoring surveys for these species have not yet been conducted—
approximately 175 lakes and streams in California.21  In early 2010, 
the state issued its final environmental assessment, which assessed 
impacts of the state’s fish stocking operations, as well as the hatchery 
operations and the issuance of Private Stocking Permits.22  The 
environmental assessment recommends a preferred alternative of 
continued fish stocking for recreational purposes with DFG 
implementing guidelines that allow for some protection of native 
species.23  The environmental assessment identifies over fifty 
potentially significant effects and includes mitigation measures to 
“reduce the impacts to less than significant.”24  Notably, the state 
acknowledged that even with the proposed actions, some impacts on 
protected species, such as the “significant adverse competition, 
predation, non‐target harvest, or genetic effects of current hatchery 
operations” on native salmon and steelhead evolutionary significant 
 
 18. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, PACIFIC RIVERS COUNCIL AND CENTER FOR 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRICTIONS ON STOCKING OF TROUT TO 
PROTECT NATIVE FISH AND AMPHIBIANS IN CALIFORNIA WATERS (2008), available at 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/fish-
stocking_reform/pdfs/PRC+CBD_statement_on_fish-stocking_agreement.pdf (discussing 
scientific studies of species affected by trout stocking). 
 19. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species Listed in California Based on Published Population 
Data, available at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/stateListingIndividual.jsp?state=CA 
&status=listed. 
 20. California Department of Fish and Game, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Draft 
Hatchery and Stocking Program Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact 
Statement Executive Summary 2 (September 2009), available at http:// 
www.dfg.ca.gov/news/pubnotice/hatchery/. 
 21. Id. 
 22. California Department of Fish and Game, DFG Hatchery Operations Environmental 
Impact Report (EIR)/Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), available at 
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/news/pubnotice/hatchery/. 
 23. California Department of Fish and Game, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Final 
Hatchery and Stocking Program Environmental Impact Report/Environmental Impact 
Statement ES-11 (January 2010), available at http://www.dfg.ca.gov/news/pubnotice/hatchery/. 
 24. Id. tbl.ES-2 and ES-12 (potentially significant impacts include competition and 
predation by stocked trout and salmon, genetic effects, and distribution of invasive species). 
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units and native steelhead distinct population segments cannot be 
reduced to “less-than-significant levels.”25 
While this case may lead to similar lawsuits brought against other 
states with “little NEPAs,”26 state fish stocking programs may also be 
attacked using the stronger federal Endangered Species Act (ESA).27  
Section 9 of the ESA subjects any person to liability for “taking” a 
protected species where an action results in direct or indirect harm to 
a protected species or its habitat.28  Whereas a direct taking of a 
protected species through hunting, shooting, or killing the animal is 
relatively straightforward, the standards for an indirect taking 
through “harm” to habitat are much more muddled.  The Secretary of 
the Interior includes the following in the definition of “harm”: 
“significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills 
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral 
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”29 
A section 9 ESA claim for fish stocking requires resolution of at 
least two30 important unanswered questions about the application of a 
taking based on habitat modification.  First, it requires a resolution of 
whether the “actual injury” prong of the harm test can be satisfied 
with injury to a population instead of an identifiable individual 
animal.31  Second, it requires resolution of the appropriate burden of 
 
 25. Id. app.K-3. 
 26. There are 16 states with little NEPAs to date.  See Council on Envt.l Quality, State 
Environmental Planning Information, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/NEPA/regs/states/states.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2009) (listing states with environmental planning laws similar to NEPA, which 
also includes the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and members of the Tahoe-Sierra 
Compact). 
 27. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
 28. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2008). 
 29. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008).  Notably, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife has expanded their 
definition of essential behavioral patterns to include “breeding, spawning, rearing, migrating, 
feeding or sheltering.”  50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2008). 
 30. Another article could be devoted to a third issue - what Professor Rasband has termed 
“multiple habitat modifiers.”  See James R. Rasband, Priority, Probability, and Proximate 
Cause: Lessons from Tort Law About Imposing ESA Responsibility for Wildlife Harm on Water 
Users and Other Joint Habitat Modifiers, 33 ENVTL. L. 595, 598 (2003).  Although the Supreme 
Court has indicated that application of the take provision appears to be subject to “ordinary 
requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability,” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 n.9 (1995), many of the habitat modification cases 
involve more than one cause.  The habitat of endangered trout, for instance, is often modified 
by not only fish stocking, but water diversion projects, droughts, and other human and natural 
interference. 
 31. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008); see also S. Quarles & T. Lundquist, When Do Land Use 
Activities ”Take” Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, SK056 ALI-
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proof required to establish an injury through “significant 
impairment.”32 
Part I of this article provides a brief background to fish stocking 
practices in the United States, including a discussion of beneficial fish 
stocking practices, as well as some of the allegations surrounding the 
detrimental effects.  Part II of this article provides some necessary 
background on section 9 of the ESA, the “actual injury” prong, the 
“significant impairment” prong, and their application to fish stocking. 
Part III of this article sets forth recommendations for future 
clarification and increased consistency on these issues.  Specifically, 
this article supports the use of two rules that can help reconcile the 
uncertain landscape surrounding a taking based on habitat 
modification.  First, “actual injury” should be found where there is 
injury to either an individual or a population of protected species.  
Second, the degree of proof required to establish an “injury” where 
essential behaviors are impaired should be bifurcated into two tests, 
depending on which behavioral pattern is being adversely affected.  
Together, these rules can bring resolution not only to scenarios like 
fish stocking, but also to other future fact patterns scrutinized under 
the habitat modification analysis. 
Part IV of this article demonstrates how application of these 
rules to states can further the goals of the ESA, both through 
voluntary reevaluation of fish stocking programs, and through 
application for an Incidental Take Permit and corresponding Habitat 
Conservation Plan.  These rules can provide two different paths to the 
same goal: to minimize adverse impacts to endangered and 
threatened species. 
I. FISH STOCKING 
For over a century in the United States, people have been 
stocking lakes and rivers with non-native fish.33  For years, this 
 
ABA 107, 123 (agreeing that “[a]ctual injury or death of wildlife and impairing essential 
behavioral patterns seem to be separate prerequisites for harm.”). 
 32. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008). 
 33. See, e.g., Lee Newman, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., The Grand Portage Project: A 
Successful Model for the Reintroduction of Lake Superior Coaster Brook Trout Populations, 
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/ashland/grndport.html (“Attempts have been made to restore 
coaster populations in Lake Superior by stocking fingerling and yearling hatchery brook trout 
on a sporadic basis for more than 100 years.”) (last visited Dec. 26, 2009); see also Pa. Fish & 
Boat Commission, PA State Fish Hatcheries: Engines for Rural Economic Development, 
available at http://www.fish.state.pa.us/hatchinfsm.pdf (describing a legislative act in 1873 that 
established Pennsylvania’s first fish hatchery). 
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seemed like the sensible thing to do.  It provided anglers with ample 
fishing opportunities and fisherman with ample bounty without 
depleting the native fish population. 
The federal government has supported fish stocking for 
recreational purposes for over a hundred and thirty years.  In 1871, 
Congress created a National Fish Hatchery System whose original 
purpose was to develop hatchery fish populations that could replace 
depleted fish populations, establish fish populations for specific 
management needs, and provide new and expanded recreational 
opportunities.34  Over the last century, over 200 federal fish hatcheries 
have been constructed and operated in forty-eight states.35  Currently, 
the National Fish Hatchery System includes seventy hatcheries in 
thirty-five states that produce more than sixty different species of fish, 
seven Fish Technology Centers, nine Fish Health Centers, and one 
Historical National Fish Hatchery.36 
Over time, the federal hatcheries have become outnumbered by 
state hatcheries.  For instance, the state of Washington has ten federal 
hatcheries and ninety-one state hatcheries to “provide sustainable 
fisheries and meet the state’s tribal treaty obligations.”37  And the 
state of Oregon has two federal hatcheries compared to thirty-three 
state hatcheries.38 
Fish stocking has many admirable goals, including rehabilitation 
of stressed populations, mitigation of effects of water projects, and 
provision of recreational opportunities for anglers.  In 2008, for 
example, environmentalists claimed a critical victory for one of 
America’s most critically endangered species, the Rio Grande silvery 
minnow.39  On December 17, 2008, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) released more than 430,000 hatchery-raised fish into former 
habitat in the Big Bend region of west Texas.40  FWS “plans to release 
additional fish there over the next four years to establish an 
 
 34. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 3. 
 35. Edwards & Nickum, supra note 14, at 42. 
 36. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., National Fish Hatcheries, http://www.fws.gov/fisheries/ 
nfhs/offices.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 37. Wash. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, Fact Sheet: The Dual Role of Washington’s 
Hatcheries: Conservation of Wild Stocks, Sustainable Fisheries (2000), http:// 
wdfw.wa.gov/factshts/hatcheries.htm; see also U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 36. 
 38. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 36; Or. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, Hatchery 
Information, http://www.dfw.state.or.us/fish/hatchery/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 39. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Program, Silvery Minnows Return 
to Texas, http://www.fws.gov/Endangered/home_stories/silvery_minnows.html (last visited Dec. 
26, 2009). 
 40. Id. 
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experimental, self-sustaining wild population in the lower Rio 
Grande.”41  And in the case of Idaho’s Dworshak Dam, the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers constructed the Dworshak National Fish 
Hatchery, the largest steelhead hatchery in the world, to mitigate for 
fishery losses from the construction and operation of the dam.42 
But during the last decade, mounting evidence suggests that 
these non-native fish are negatively impacting the native fish and 
amphibian species.43  The Congressionally established Hatchery 
Scientific Review Group (HSRG) determined that in the Columbia 
River Basin in the Pacific Northwest “hatchery programs – as 
currently operated – were contributing to the risks those [threatened 
or endangered salmon] were facing.”44  Hatchery fish are starting to 
dominate wild fish in many locations,45 and scientific studies regarding 
the harms to native fish populations are growing in abundance.46 
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The issue is complicated by the fact that a number of the species 
affected by hatchery-released fish in the United States are protected 
under the Endangered Species Act.47  There are thirty-four marine 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Dworshak Dam and Reservoir, 
http://www.nww.usace.army.mil/dpn/dpn_project.asp?project_id=43 (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 43. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text; see also Murray Carpenter, On a Hunt for 
Fishless Lakes, Teeming with Life, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at D2, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/science/earth/28Lake.html (focusing on the negative 
impacts of stocking fish in fishless lakes in Maine). 
 44. HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON COLUMBIA 
RIVER BASIN HATCHERY REFORM 3 (2009), available at http://www.hatcheryreform.us/ 
hrp_downloads/reports/ columbia_river/report_to_congress/hsrg_report_12.pdf. 
 45. See, e.g., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Northeast Fishery Center: Recent Projects of the 
Population Ecology Branch, http://www.fws.gov/northeast/fisherycenter/popeco_projects.html 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2009) (noting that the Northeast Fishery Center’s program of “[h]atchery 
propagation and stocking of American shad represent a large component of restoration efforts 
in the Susquehanna River. In a subsample of the returning adult population at Conowingo Dam 
in 2003, approximately 26% of the adults were of wild origin, and 74% were of hatchery 
origin.”). 
 46. See HELFMAN, supra note 7. 
 47. See, e.g., CAL. TROUT, SOS: CALIFORNIA’S NATIVE FISH CRISIS 38–39, 50–51 (2008), 
available at http://www.caltrout.org/SoS-Californias-Native-Fish-Crisis.pdf (determining that the 
Southern Oregon/Northern California Coho Salmon and Northern California Coast Summer 
Steelhead, listed as threatened under the ESA, are both at risk from hatcheries, among other 
factors); see also Pac. Rivers Council, California’s Aerial Fish Stocking Program Endangers 
Native Frogs (August 1, 2001), http://www.pacificrivers.org/about/press/releases/californias-
aerial-fish-stocking-program-endangers-native-frogs (noting impact of over-stocking of fish on 
the endangered mountain yellow-legged frog). 
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and anadromous fish listed as threatened or endangered.48  Eighteen 
salamanders are listed as endangered, threatened, or candidate 
species across California, Arizona, Florida, South Carolina, Georgia, 
Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Alabama.49  And the Fish and 
Wildlife Service has sufficient information to warrant listing for 249 
candidate species,50 but for which proposed listing regulations are 
“precluded by other higher priority listing activities.”51 
Promulgated in 1973, the Endangered Species Act recognizes the 
value in preserving biodiversity.52  Section 9 and its regulations make 
it unlawful for any “person”53 to “take” an endangered or threatened 
species.54  The regulations define “take” broadly: “to harass, harm, 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to 
attempt to engage in any such conduct.”55  The Supreme Court has 
determined that a take need not be intentional to establish liability 
under section 9,56 and that ESA liability is not limited to direct 
applications of force against a protected species.57  In addition to civil 
and criminal penalties, injunctive relief is available for violating 
section 9 of the ESA.58 
 
 48. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Fisheries Serv., Office of Protected Res., 
Marine/Anadromous Fish Species Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/esa/fish.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 49. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species Reports, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/ 
SpeciesReport.do (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 50. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species Reports, http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/ 
SpeciesReport.do?listingType=C&mapstatus=1 (last visited Dec. 26, 2009). 
 51. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Candidate Species: Section 4 of the Endangered Species 
Act, available at http://www.fws.gov/ENDANGERED/factsheets/candidate_species.pdf. 
 52. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, 1531(a)(3) and (b) (2006) 
(finding that the species of fish, wildlife, and plants in danger of or threatened with extinction 
“are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the 
Nation and its people” and that the purpose of the Act is “to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved”). 
 53. Although much of the analysis surrounding section 9’s “person” definition surrounds its 
application to private actors, the ESA defines “person” to include “any officer, employee, 
agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or 
political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or 
political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(13). 
 54. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (protecting endangered species); id. § 1533(d) (authorizing the 
Services to extend the take prohibitions of section 9 to threatened species by regulation). 
 55. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2006). 
 56. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995). 
 57. Id. at 697. 
 58. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2006). 
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The Secretary of the Interior explains that “harm” in the 
definition of “take” in the ESA regulations “may include significant 
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, 
including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”59  “[H]abitat modification 
or degradation, standing alone, is not a taking pursuant to section 9.”60  
The impairment of essential behavioral patterns must be 
accompanied by an “actual” death or injury to wildlife.61  In Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities, the Supreme Court held that 
the Secretary of Interior rightly interpreted “harm” to include habitat 
modification, but left open issues about the precise application of this 
definition to real-world scenarios.62  Two of these ambiguities are at 
issue in this article. 
A. The Problem with “Actual Injury” 
The first ambiguity lies in the requirement that there be an 
“actual” death or injury and the difference between injury to an 
individual protected animal and injury to a population of protected 
species.  The confusion surrounding this issue can be conflated with 
the level of proof required to establish injury.  While a wounded or 
dead protected animal will surely suffice, what are courts to do when 
there is no proverbial “dead body” of a protected species available as 
proof of harm?  Prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Sweet Home, 
lower courts had taken a relatively broad view of “actual harm,” 
rejecting arguments that “actual injury” requires: (1) evidence of 
actual death of individual members of the protected species;63 or (2) 
threatened extinction of a species.64  In one of the earlier decisions on 
this issue, the Federal District Court of Hawaii stated: 
[a] finding of “harm” does not require death to individual members 
of the species; nor does it require a finding that habitat degradation 
 
 59. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008). 
 60. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of "Harm," 46 
Fed. Reg. 54, 748 (1981). 
 61. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 703–4. 
 62. See id. at 695, 699-700.  This is one limitation of facial challenges, such as the one 
brought in Sweet Home. 
 63. See, e.g., Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land and Natural Res., 649 F.Supp. 1070, 1075 (D. 
Haw.1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 64. See Swan View Coal., Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992).  Notably, 
the District Court of Hawaii resurrected the “extinction” test when it denied summary judgment 
where “it is not certain that lobster plays such an essential role in the monk seal diet that a 
reduction of lobster prey dooms the monk seal to extinction.”   Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 
122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1134 (D. Haw. 2000). 
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is presently driving the species further toward extinction.  Habitat 
destruction that prevents the recovery of the species by affecting 
essential behavioral patterns causes actual injury to the species and 
effects [sic] a taking under section 9 of the Act.65 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not make clear whether 
actual injury to the population is sufficient to satisfy this element or 
whether actual injury to an individual member of a species is 
required.  In a footnote, however, the Court appears to reject an 
interpretation of a taking that applies only to “some creature,” as 
opposed to a “species.”66  The Court states that limiting a take to an 
exercise of power over an animal “ill serves the statutory text, which 
forbids not taking ‘some creature’ but ‘taking any [endangered] 
species.’”67  And in his dissent, Justice Scalia highlights that the Final 
Redefinition of “Harm” accompanying the final regulation states that 
“harm” refers to “injury to a population.”68  In this regulation, the 
Secretary of Interior states that “harm” is not limited to “direct 
physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife species.”69  
Interpreted in this light, this regulation can be interpreted to mean 
that the “actual” injury prong can be satisfied without a “dead body.” 
But Justices in both the concurring and dissenting Sweet Home 
opinions are reluctant, and adamantly opposed, respectively, to an 
interpretation that allows harm to a population to satisfy the actual 
injury requirement where habitat modification or degradation is at 
issue.  Justice O’Connor explicitly indicates that, from her 
perspective, “the harm regulation applies where significant habitat 
modification . . . causes actual death or injury to identifiable 
animals.”70  And Justice Scalia, in dissent, points to the regulation’s 
inclusion of injury to populations as the “most important unlawful 
feature of the regulation.”71  His problem is that the regulation 
“encompasses injury inflicted, not only upon individual animals, but 
upon populations of the protected species.”72  The majority appears to 
 
 65. Palila, 649 F. Supp. at 1075. 
 66. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697 n.10. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of "Harm," 46 
Fed. Reg. 54, 748 (1981). 
 70. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 713 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. 
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agree, stating in a footnote that the dissent was incorrect to suggest 
the regulation fails “to require injury to particular animals.”73 
Section 9 habitat modification cases subsequent to Sweet Home 
generally have evoked the individual versus population debate in the 
context of requests for injunctive relief.74  And although the Supreme 
Court stated that “[section] 9 cannot be enforced until a killing or 
injury has occurred,”75 that has not prevented lower courts from 
granting injunctive relief even where a harm has yet to occur.  
Rejecting the Supreme Court’s statements to the contrary as dictum, 
the Ninth Circuit granted an injunction even where there had been no 
previous injury so long as the plaintiff could demonstrate a 
“reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species.”76 
Many courts have found injury to a population as sufficient 
“actual injury.”77  As two scholars have noted, where injunctions are 
sought against “future conduct – most commonly indirect harm 
through habitat destruction – the actual focus of the judicial inquiry 
shifts from injury of individual species members to conservation of 
the entire species or species populations.”78  Under the “reasonably 
certain” test, some courts appear to accept proof of either individual 
deaths or injuries or a “general decline in the population.”79  Even the 
First Circuit’s more stringent pre-Sweet Home approach appears to 
 
 73. Id. at 700 n.13. 
 74. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
1108 (1997) (preliminary injunction granted); Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. 
Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 554 (D.V.I. 1998) (preliminary injunction denied); Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 1999) (permanent injunction denied); United 
States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., No. CIV. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 298707, at *6 (D. Or. Mar. 
13, 2000) (permanent injunction denied); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. 
Supp. 2d 860, 868 (D. Ariz. 2003) (preliminary injunction denied); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. 
Sutherland, 2007 WL 2220256, at *17 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (preliminary injunction denied in part 
and granted in part). 
 75. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 688. 
 76. Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1066 (holding that Sweet Home did not overrule the 
“reasonably certain” test articulated in Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 
F.3d. 781, 784–785 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 77. See id.; see also Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 
Haw. 1988); Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. Haw. 1981) 
(finding “actual injury” without a dead or injured individual bird, but with evidence of harm to 
population). 
 78. Federico Cheever & Michael Balster, The Take Prohibition in Section 9 of the 
Endangered Species Act: Contradictions, Ugly Ducklings, and Conservation of Species, 34 
ENVTL. L. 363, 372 (2004). 
 79. Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (finding that plaintiffs provided no evidence 
of any general decline in the population of the Tree Boa); see, e.g., Swan View Coal. v. Turner, 
824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992) (relying on grizzly bear population decline). 
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accept actual injury to a population as opposed to only actual injury 
to an identifiable member of a protected species.80 
While other courts have not explicitly rejected proof of injury to 
protected populations, the analyses have focused on actual harm to 
individuals.  One lower court has elaborated on the “reasonably 
certain threat of imminent harm” test, requiring either a “dead body” 
or proof of proximity of the “endangered or threatened animal” to 
the challenged action to demonstrate “actual injury.”81 
Some courts have used an “impairment of recovery” theory, 
where proof that the “habitat degradation prevents, or possibly, 
retards, recovery of [the] species” is sufficient to issue an injunction.82  
One might predict that this theory would focus on injury to the 
population, but in both cases using this theory, the courts focused on 
individual harms.83  In rejecting the “impairment of recovery” theory, 
a lower court again focused on individual harm, noting the “threat of 
actual injury to these owls” detected in four project areas. 84 
The same treatment can be seen where injunctions are not at 
issue.  In an appeal of a summary judgment determination, the Ninth 
Circuit focuses on the lack of a causal connection between the 
challenged actions and the one specific eagle “Ridge nest” that failed 
to reproduce.85 
B.  The Problem of Determining When “Significant Impairment”     
 Constitutes “Injury” 
The second ambiguity at issue in this article lies in the 
requirement that the impairment of the essential behavioral pattern 
be significant.  Specifically, it is unclear how much impairment of 
behavioral patterns is sufficient to constitute injury and a taking 
under the habitat modification clause.  “Significant” is not defined in 
 
 80. American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F.3d 163, 166 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting cases where 
there was harm to “the species.”). 
 81. Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 844, 880–81 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (emphasis 
added) (finding that protected species in the “vicinity” is not enough where there was no 
evidence of the animals “at the project site”). 
 82. United States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., No. CIV. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 298707, at 
*15 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2000) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1513 
(9th Cir. 1994)). 
 83. See id. at *5 (analysis focused on injury to one “owl pair”); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 
23 F.3d at 1512 (finding no evidence of “deaths of members of a protected species” (emphasis 
added)). 
 84. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Sutherland, 2007 WL 2220256, at *15–16 (W.D. Wash. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
 85. Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 889–890 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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the ESA or regulations, but essential behavioral patterns include 
three primary needs of the species: “breeding, feeding, or 
sheltering.”86  As Justice O’Connor remarked, “[b]reeding, feeding, 
and sheltering are what animals do.”87 
Breeding took prominence in the Sweet Home case.  In her Sweet 
Home concurrence, Justice O’Connor took a narrow view of 
“significant,” suggesting that only “completely preventing breeding” 
or making it “impossible for an animal to reproduce” would satisfy 
the requirement of significant impairment that causes actual injury.88  
As one scholar deftly points out, under her analysis “merely making 
spawning more difficult . . . would not be enough.” 89 
Justice O’Connor proceeded, however, to identify two other 
scenarios where mere “interference with breeding” can cause an 
actual injury.  The first is where habitat modification prevents an 
animal in a “vulnerable breeding state” from fleeing or defending 
itself.90  The second is where environmental pollutants cause an 
animal to suffer “physical complications during gestation.”91  Neither 
of these actions suggest complete impairment is required to establish 
harm.   
The lack of clarity left the lower courts in some disarray.  No 
court has explicitly addressed what constitutes “significant” 
impairment.  In Marbled Murrelet, however, the Ninth Circuit found 
that an increased risk of harm to breeding constituted “significant 
impairment.”92  But district courts have found that making it more 
difficult for a protected species to find food or shelter does not 
constitute significant impairment.93 
 
 86. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2008). 
 87. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 710 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. (“One need not subscribe to theories of ‘psychic harm’ . . . to recognize that to make 
it impossible for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most essential physical functions and to 
render that animal, and its genetic material, biologically obsolete.  This, in my view, is actual 
injury.”). 
 89. Rasband, supra note 30, at 609. 
 90. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 710 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 93. See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 554 
(D.V.I. 1998); United States v. W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., No. CIV. 96-1575-HO, 2000 WL 
298707, at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2000); Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1134 
(D. Haw. 2000). 
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C. Application of Section 9 to Fish Stocking 
In some ways, an analysis of the impacts of fish stocking should 
be simple.  Many of the obstacles discussed in prior analyses, 
including foreseeability, vicarious liability of state agencies, and 
injunction of future harms,94 are not show-stoppers here.  Yet fish 
stocking is emblematic of a common factual circumstance found in 
“harm via habitat degradation” cases.  There is no individual “dead 
body” and there is not complete impairment of an individual or 
population’s essential breeding, feeding, or sheltering patterns. 
1. “Actual Injury” From Fish Stocking 
Under an interpretation of “actual injury”95 that allows for injury 
to populations, a strong case can be made that the addition of 
hatchery fish can cause “actual injury” to protected species.  The 
Ninth Circuit recently ruled on the appropriateness of the National 
Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) decisions regarding the impacts of 
hatchery-raised salmon on naturally spawned salmon.96  In doing so, 
the court found that hatchery programs pose “risks to the genetic 
diversity and longterm reproductive fitness of local natural steelhead 
populations,”97 including: (1) “excessive mortality of natural steelhead 
in fisheries targeting hatchery-origin steelhead; (2) “competition for 
prey and habitat”; (3) predation by hatchery-origin fish on younger 
natural fish”; (4) “genetic introgression by hatchery-origin fish 
that . . . interbreed with local natural populations”; (5) “disease 
transmission”; (6) “degraded water quality and quantity”; and (7) 
“impediments to fish passage imposed by hatchery facilities.”98  
Scientific studies would likely be able to demonstrate similar findings, 
and perhaps show a population decline where fish stocking occurs or 
a population increase where fish stocking has been abandoned.99 
Nevertheless, a claim could fail if a court were to require actual 
death or injury to one, identifiable protected fish or salamander.  It is 
unlikely that there is one identifiable fish that was injured as a result 
of fish stocking.  Each of the injuries alleged fails to provide the 
 
 94. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered Species Act, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733 (2002). 
 95. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
 96. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 97. Id. at 948 (citation omitted). 
 98. Id. at 948–949 (citing National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Final Listing 
Determinations for 10 Distinct Population Segments of West Coast Steelhead, 71 Fed. Reg. 834, 
856 (Jan. 5, 2006)). 
 99. See, e.g., Ted Williams, supra note 1. 
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desired “dead body.”  Stocking hatchery-raised individuals into a 
body of water that contains a naturally occurring protected 
population of the same species may result in the dilution of the 
protected population’s gene pool.  Though genetic dilution does not 
injure an individual of the naturally occurring population per se, it 
can cause harm on the population level.100  Injecting new competitors 
for food and habitat does not lend itself to capturing evidence of a 
native fish losing out to a hatchery fish.101  And it is difficult to 
document whether hatchery-raised fish are out-competing naturally 
occurring individuals for food, or if hatchery-raised fish are preying 
on naturally occurring individuals and their young.  As a result, an 
Endangered Species Act claim regarding fish stocking practices is 
most likely to succeed where a court is amenable to the argument that 
injury to a population is sufficient for actual injury. 
2.  “Significant Impairment” of Essential Behavior Patterns    
From Fish Stocking 
Similarly, under an interpretation of “significant impairment”102 
that acknowledges partial impairment of essential behavioral 
patterns, a strong case can be made that the addition of hatchery fish 
can significantly impair the breeding or feeding of protected 
populations.  For instance, the pleadings in the CEQA fish stocking 
case allege the following breeding impairment: 
When hatchery trout interbreed with a wild trout population, the 
addition of genes from the hatchery fish renders that population 
‘genetically extinct.’ [citation omitted].  The population ceases to 
exist as a true genetic component of the species and becomes an 
amalgam of two different species, with an irreversibly clouded 
genetic legacy, loss or distortion of local adaptations, an uncertain 
ability to adapt to future conditions, and negligible ability to 
contribute to the survival of the indigenous species. [citation 
omitted]  The Department’s staff admit that stocking has already 
caused this problem: ‘Because of the hybridized condition of these 
 
 100. See HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, supra note 11, at 2 (noting the difficulties 
in detecting the genetic risks to natural populations of Pacific salmon and steelhead that exist 
from natural spawning of hatchery fish). 
 101. See HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, COLUMBIA RIVER HATCHERY REFORM 
PROJECT, FINAL SYSTEM-WIDE REPORT, APPENDIX A.7: OUTPLANTING AND NET PEN 
RELEASE OF HATCHERY-ORIGIN FISH 3, available at 
http://www.hatcheryreform.us/hrp_downloads/reports/columbia_river/systemwide/4_appendix_a
_7_outplanting_and_netpen_releases.pdf (“[H]atchery summer steelhead adults and their 
offspring may have contributed to wild winter steelhead population declines through 
competition for spawning and rearing habitats.”). 
 102. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
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golden trout, fish in this location, in my opinion, will not contribute 
to the long-term conservation and restoration of California golden 
trout.’ [citation omitted]103 
While not a complete prevention of breeding, these allegations 
establish that fish stocking has disrupted the normal reproduction of 
the protected species.  One could argue that because the normal 
reproduction of protected fish has been negatively disrupted, the 
protected fish population has been injured, resulting in a taking. 
Nevertheless, a claim could fail if a court were to require 
complete impairment, as suggested by Justice O’Connor.  Injecting 
new mates into the waterbody does not completely prevent the native 
fish from breeding.  And injecting new competitors for food sources 
does not completely impair the native fish from feeding.  It merely 
adds an additional stressor on an already stressed population.  
Nevertheless, even though significant impairment is open to 
interpretation, reducing such stressors to preserve the ability of native 
populations to survive fits squarely within the goals of the ESA.104 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTUAL INJURY AND SIGNIFICANT 
IMPAIRMENT 
Adoption of two key recommendations can both bring 
consistency to these muddied waters and bring the results closer to 
the purposes of the ESA.105  First, the “actual injury” prong of the 
harm test should be satisfied where there is injury to either an 
individual or a population of protected species.  Second, the degree of 
proof required to establish an “injury” where essential behaviors are 
impaired should be bifurcated into two tests, depending on which 
behavioral pattern is being adversely affected. 
A.  Injury to a Protected Population Should Be Sufficient to Establish 
“Actual Injury” 
First, the “actual injury” prong of the harm test should be 
satisfied where there is injury to either an individual or a population 
of protected species.  This analysis accords with earlier scholars who 
have argued that injury should consider both individuals and 
populations.106  As they have noted, “the words in the definition of 
 
 103. Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 18, at 7–8. 
 104. See Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he ESA’s primary 
goal is to preserve the ability of natural populations to survive in the wild.”). 
 105. See, e.g., id. (identifying a primary purpose of the ESA). 
 106. Cheever & Balsten, supra note 78, at 363. 
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take – harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect – all describe action generally done to individuals.”107  “Injury 
to species and populations plays no explicit role.”108  Regardless, they 
argue that to remain faithful to the conservation purposes of the 
ESA, courts must interpret section 9 to apply to populations “to 
protect species and the ecosystems upon which they depend in order 
to allow species to recover to the point where they no longer require 
protection under the Act.”109 
But there is another reason to extend the reach of section 9 to 
injury to populations.  Common sense demands it.  Limiting “actual 
harm” to individual animals would result in a world where a person is 
liable under section 9 for wounding one wolf in the ear (a minimal 
injury with little long-term harm to the species), but would have free 
reign to adversely modify the habitat of the entire population of 
wolves so long as no single wolf exhibits signs of injury (a more 
damaging action with long-term harm to the species). 
This approach is further supported by the lack of alternative 
mechanisms in the law to prevent a non-federal activity110 that will 
impair the essential behavioral functions of a population of 
endangered species.  The two most likely alternatives both have 
significant limitations.  The first, to purchase the habitat under section 
5 of the ESA111 is dependent on adequate funding.  The second, to 
designate the land as critical habitat, would suffer from substantial 
delay.  The federal wildlife agencies have proved to be overwhelmed 
administratively with the critical habitat decisions.112  As of December 
1, 2005, only 471 of the 1272 listed species have had their requisite 
critical habitat designation and the FWS has indicated that this is a 
“low priority” in light of the backlog of species listing decisions.113 
 
 107. Id. at 369. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 396. 
 110. Section 7 of the ESA, which requires consultation for these population-level effects, 
fails to hold non-federal actors accountable for activities that jeopardize the existence of a listed 
species unless there was federal approval of the private activity.  16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006). 
 111. Section 5 of the ESA authorizes the Secretary to “acquire by purchase, donation, or 
otherwise, lands, waters, or interest therein, and such authority shall be in addition to any other 
land acquisition vested in him.”  16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(2) (2006). 
 112. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Critical Habitat, What is it?, available at 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/listing/Critical_Habitat_12_05.pdf. 
 113. Id. 
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B.  Significant Impairment of Breeding Should be Sufficient Proof to 
Establish Injury 
Second, the degree of proof required to establish an “injury” 
where essential behaviors are significantly impaired should be 
bifurcated into two tests, depending on which behavioral pattern is 
being adversely affected.  Specifically, courts should apply a 
presumption of “actual injury” where the breeding of a protected 
individual or population is significantly impaired, even where there is 
less than complete impairment of reproduction.  Alternatively, where 
the feeding or sheltering of a protected individual or population is 
significantly impaired, the courts can apply a stricter level of proof of 
injury.114 
Of the three behavioral patterns identified by the Secretary of 
the Interior, impairment of breeding is arguably the most devastating 
to protected species.115  Where a protected species’ reproduction is 
disrupted, an entire generation of a species is lost.  Furthermore, of 
the three behavioral patterns, impairment of breeding hits at the root 
of endangered species protection.  Protecting the reproductive 
function of a species is the primary means to ensure the propagation 
and/or recovery of a species.  An animal that is well-fed with a home 
does little to serve the goals of the ESA if it is unable or hindered in 
its ability to reproduce. 
Even the common definition of “impair” suggests that Justice 
O’Connor’s interpretation of impairment of breeding is too narrow. 
“Impair” is defined as “to damage or make worse by or as if by 
diminishing in some material respect.”116  Read literally, the 
regulation therefore requires only that the action significantly worsen 
breeding, not that the action significantly prevent breeding. 
Furthermore, one of the primary arguments against allowing a 
significant impairment of a behavioral pattern to constitute injury on 
 
 114. The test for feeding and sheltering should still fall short of the narrow “complete 
impairment” test suggested by Justice O’Connor.  See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Greater Or. 515 U.S. 687, 710 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Perhaps a “near 
complete impairment” test could address the efforts of prior courts to focus on whether the 
disrupted food source or habitat was “essential” to the species.  See e.g., Greenpeace Found. v. 
Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133 (D. Haw. 2000). 
 115. See, e.g., Michael A. Palladino, Male Reproductive Function, http:// 
www.biologyreference.com/La-Ma/Male-Reproductive-System.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2009) 
(“Reproduction is essential for any species to sustain its population. In the simplest sense, the 
most important function of every living organism is reproduction.”). 
 116. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, IMPAIR, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/impairment. 
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its own is the ability of animals to adapt.117  Even if the likelihood of 
harm has been increased by a plaintiff’s actions, there is no guarantee 
of harm.  The animals may adapt to a plaintiff’s actions in a manner 
that results in no harm to the individuals or the populations. 
This argument is plausible when applied to habitat modification 
of feeding or sheltering behavior.  Nature has repeatedly proven that 
it is more resilient than we give it credit for.  In some cases, it may be 
just as likely that the animals will be able to find alternative sources 
of food or move to alternative sources of shelter. 
Whereas impairment of feeding and sheltering may not 
necessarily cause injury to a protected species because they can adapt 
and find alternative food (depending on availability) and alternative 
shelter (depending on their mobility), impairment of a breeding 
and/or natural reproduction rises to a different level because of the 
enhanced difficulties in adapting to reproductive disruptions.  
Although one could imagine some nest or den destructions where the 
animal may be able to relocate to alternative breeding grounds, many 
of the breeding impairments do not make themselves amenable to 
adaptation. 118 
Implicitly, the courts appear to agree with this distinction.119  The 
only cases where courts have found harm based on habitat 
modification are where impairment of breeding was at issue.120  Where 
 
 117. See, e.g., Steven G. Davison, The Aftermath of Sweet Home Chapter: Modification of 
Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking in Violation of the Endangered Species Act, 27 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 541, 578•79 (2003) (noting adaptations available from 
impairment of feeding, breeding, and sheltering). 
 118. The courts could allow this presumption to be rebutted by evidence that a specific 
animal was able to reproduce despite the disruptive activity, as suggested by Professor Davison.  
Id. 
 119. See also Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S., 296 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting 
without analysis or any discussion of attendant injury that “deforestation of breeding habitat 
constitutes harm under the statute.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (“Thus, under Sweet Home, a habitat modification which significantly 
impairs the breeding and sheltering of a protected species amounts to ‘harm’ under the ESA.”); 
Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d. 781, 783 (9th Cir. 1995) (“FCC 
proffered evidence to show that Rosboro's planned timber harvest is reasonably certain to 
injure the Swartz Creek owl pair by significantly impairing their . . .  breeding”); Swan View 
Coal. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 936 (D. Mont. 1992) (plaintiffs allege injury to “grizzly bears 
and gray wolves by significantly impairing their . . . breeding”); Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land and 
Natural Res., 649 F.Supp. 1070, 1080 (D. Haw. 1986) (“The mouflon are having a significant 
negative impact on the mamane forest, on which the Palila is wholly dependent for breeding”).  
This is not to say that plaintiffs succeed every time impairment of breeding is alleged.  Where 
the courts have rejected these allegations, the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient proof that the 
protected animals were present in the affected area, Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Sutherland, 2007 
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only impairment of feeding or sheltering was at issue, the courts have 
rejected section 9 habitat modification claims.121  And at least one 
court has found injury from breeding impairment where the action 
caused genetic problems in subsequent woodpecker generations, 
similar to that alleged in native fish populations stocked with hatchery 
fish.122 
Therefore, although a court may require complete impairment of 
feeding or sheltering to be significant, a less stringent standard should 
be applied to actions that impair the reproductive function of a 
protected species.  The standard to be applied should recognize that 
hindering or slowing reproduction of an individual or a population of 
protected species creates a presumption of “injury” under the harm 
provision.123 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO SECTION 9 LIABILITY 
Application of these rules is likely to broaden the reach of 
takings based on habitat modification from fish stocking.  This added 
pressure on states may serve to further the goals of the ESA, both 
through voluntary reevaluation of fish stocking programs, and 
through application for Incidental Take Permits and corresponding 
Habitat Conservation Plans.124  Both of these paths would contribute 
to the same goal: to minimize adverse impacts to endangered and 
threatened species. 
 
WL 2220256, at *15 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (plaintiff presented no evidence the owls occupy 218 of 
the sites at issue); that the breeding impacts were caused by the challenged action, Cold 
Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2004); or that the breeding was actually 
negatively impaired by the actions, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 
860, 880 (D. Ariz. 2003) (determining that eagle nesting productivity is affected by density of 
competing eagle nests, not reservoir levels); W. Coast Forest Res. Ltd., No. CIV. 96-1575-HO, 
2000 WL 298707, at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2000) (“[T]he owls maintain relatively high reproductive 
rates.”). 
 121. See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 554 
(D.V.I. 1998) (rejecting habitat modification claim because there was no evidence that Tree 
Boas had died or been injured as a result of changes in their feeding and sheltering patterns); W. 
Coast Forest Resources, 2000 WL 298707, at *5 (rejecting habitat modification where ample 
food sources existed); Greenpeace Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1132 (D. Haw. 2000) 
(rejecting habitat modification where ample food sources existed). 
 122. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp 1260, 1272 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d in part and vacated 
in part, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Isolation also causes the gene pool to be reduced with 
fewer birds in a given area, causing genetic problems and abnormalities in the subsequent 
generations.”); see also Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 103. 
 123. This approach differs from prior interpretations suggested by Quarles & Lundquist, 
supra note 31 (arguing that “reducing breeding success rate at the population level is not take”). 
 124. See infra sections A and B. 
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A. Voluntary Reevaluation of Fish Stocking to Minimize Impacts to 
Endangered or Threatened Species 
States that suspect their actions may trigger section 9 liability can 
find themselves encouraged to perform a voluntary reevaluation of 
their fish stocking policies.  Such self-assessments are not a new idea.  
In accordance with a policy committing NMFS and FWS to identify, 
to the extent possible, those activities that would or would not violate 
section 9 of the ESA with respect to West Coast Salmon, NMFS 
included “[r]eleasing non-indigenous or artificially propagated species 
into a listed species’ habitat or where they may access the habitat of 
listed species.” 125  The rule provides that “[p]ersons or entities 
concluding that their activity is likely to injure or kill protected fish 
are encouraged to immediately adjust that activity to avoid take (or 
adequately limit any impacts on the species) and seek NMFS’ 
authorization for incidental take under: (a) an ESA section 10 
incidental take permit; (b) an ESA section 7 consultation; or (c) a 
limit on the take prohibitions provided in this proposed rule.” 126 
More recently, in February 2009, the Congressionally-established 
Hatchery Scientific Review group (HSRG) determined that both 
harvest and hatchery reforms are needed to help salmon and 
steelhead in the Pacific Northwest.127  Taking the lead in this 
endeavor, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA)’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has launched 
the review of over 100 federally funded salmon and steelhead 
hatchery programs in the Columbia River basin to assure they do not 
hinder efforts to recover protected fish species.128  NOAA will be 
developing biological opinions to assess whether the federal actions 
jeopardize the survival of the thirteen “evolutionarily listed units” or 
“designated population segments” in the Columbia River basin.129  
The potential for ESA liability may encourage more of such 
 
 125. Endangered and Threatened Species; Proposed Rule Governing Take of Four 
Threatened Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs) of West Coast Salmonids: California 
Central Valley Spring-run Chinook; California Coastal Chinook; Northern California Steelhead; 
Central California Coast Coho, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,150•54 (August 17, 2001) (codified at 50 C.F.R. 
pt. 223). 
 126. Id. 
 127. HATCHERY SCIENTIFIC REVIEW GROUP, supra note 44. 
 128. NOAA to Launch ESA Review of 100 Federally Funded Basin Hatchery Projects, 
COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.fishbio.com/home/16-news/269-noaa-to-
launch-esa-review-of-100-federally-funded-basin-hatchery-programs.html. 
 129. Id. 
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beneficial assessments and result in scientifically appropriate 
adjustments to fish stocking without the inefficiencies of litigation. 
B. Incidental Take Permits 
As alluded to above, states can also seek to immunize their fish 
stocking practices from ESA liability with an Incidental Take Permit 
(ITP).  Section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA allows people who determine 
that their “otherwise lawful activity” will result in the incidental 
taking of a protected species to apply for an ITP from FWS.130  
Receipt of an ITP immunizes the person from liability under the 
ESA.131  FWS uses five criteria to determine whether to issue the ITP: 
(1) the taking will be incidental; (2) the applicant will, to the 
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of 
such taking; (3) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for 
the plan will be provided; (4) the taking will not appreciably reduce 
the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild; 
and (5) the measures, if any, required under [16 U.S.C. § 
1539(a)(2)(A)(iv) ] will be met; [and][the Service] has received such 
other assurances as [it] may require that the [habitat conservation 
plan] will be implemented[.]132 
As a prerequisite to receiving an ITP, the applicant must submit 
a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) that specifies “(i) the impact 
which will likely result from such taking; (ii) what steps the applicant 
will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the funding that 
will be available to implement such steps; (iii) what alternative 
actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why 
such alternatives are not being utilized; and (iv) such other measures 
that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate for 
purposes of the plan.” 133 
As one scholar has noted, rather than serve to eliminate all 
actions that would harm species, “section 9 functions as a sorting 
mechanism to identify those activities that require an incidental take 
permit before they may proceed.”134  This “serves as a mechanism to 
 
 130. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 131. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2) (2006). 
 132. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b)(2) (2008); id. § 17.32(b)(2) 
(2008). 
 133. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).  The federal agency’s approval of this ITP constitutes a 
federal action that triggers section 7 consultation obligations for the federal agency.  See Animal 
Protection Inst. v. Holsten, 541 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1076 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 134. Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in 
the Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 691 (2008). 
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force dischargers to the negotiating table to acquire permits.”135  In 
the case of fish stocking, the creation of HCPs would allow the states 
to determine which waterbodies are home to endangered species, 
identify those species being injured by fish stocking, and selectively 
adapt the fish stocking programs in a way that maintains the 
beneficial effects of fish stocking in some areas while minimizing the 
harm to protected species. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The political ramifications of reevaluating fish stocking are not to 
be underestimated.  As indicated by the opening line of this article, 
the fate of fish stocking often pits fishermen against environmentalists 
and conservation biologists.  Fishing is an integral part of the culture 
of many Americans, as well as the economies of many states.  
Employment opportunities are dependent on state hatcheries, and 
“increased enthusiasm for fishing directly affects the state’s sales of 
sport-fishing licenses.”136  Conversely, “[w]hen the state’s ability to 
stock lakes and rivers with fish dwindles, so does the ability to sell 
fishing licenses.”137 
Although it is difficult to change the status quo with respect to a 
century of fish stocking, particularly one so engrained with political 
consequences, the state wildlife agencies outside of California may 
want to heed the warning sent by the California Superior Court and 
take advantage of the opportunity to reevaluate their fish stocking 
programs to assess the impact on endangered and threatened species.  
Piecemeal policies forced by court order without a comprehensive 
and coordinated approach could lead to inconsistent and inefficient 
efforts.  By being proactive in response to potential ESA litigation, 
the agencies may be able to take the time to make reasoned 
adjustments to their fish stocking practices that balance the needs of 
its wildlife with the desires of its constituents. 
 
 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Nicholas Johnson, Fewer hatcheries means less jobs for Huxley grads, WESTERN FRONT, 
Mar. 10, 2009, available at http://westernfrontonline.net/2009031010797/news/fewer-hatcheries-
means-less-jobs-for-huxley-grads/. 
 137. Id. 
